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1. Introduction to the case 
This case study deals with the development of the management process for the implementation 
of  Structural  Funds  in four  Central  and  Eastern  European  (CEE)  countries  (Poland,  Slovakia, 
Romania and Hungary)
1, and focus on one Hungarian region’s (Southern Transdanubia) Regional 
Operational Programme planning and implementation process.  
From a research point of view, the relevant policy areas are European Cohesion Policy and the 
process of strategic planning directed at the access to Structural Funds (SF) money. We will 
analyse the context of these policy areas and territorial governance, and the impacts that they 
have on each other.  
The aims of Cohesion Policy fit into the expected development objectives of Europe 2020 with 
the  main  objective  to  decrease  regional  disparities.  One  potential  instrument  of  this  policy 
objective could be the making and acceptance and implantation of “bottom-up” regional plans 
(with involvement of regional stakeholders). Another way could be the creation of regionally 
sensitive National Strategic Reference Frameworks (NSRFs), and there may be a combination of 
both. We will also examine the Regional Operational Programmes’ (ROP) embedded position in 
the  investigated  countries’  national  plans,  and  its  connections  to  the  sectorial  Operational 
Programmes (OPs). 
Structural  Funds  (SF)  have  a  significant  impact  on  public  administration,  especially  in  CEE 
countries, where the absorption of the EU subsidies is one of the most important policy and 
political ambitions. However, the governance regime of SF is a considerable challenge, since 
traditional government structures and practices in CEE countries do not typically harmonise 
with  the  principles  of  subsidiarity,  decentralisation,  regionalism,  partnership,  efficiency, 
transparency and strategic, integrated planning. Therefore, CEE countries have tried to adapt to 
these challenges in different ways. They do so institutionally by implementing internal structural 
reforms  of  public  administration  (learning)  and/or  by  establishing  separate,  “unfamiliar” 
structures and institutions to better fit to the SF system (imitating). Further, there are functional 
changes in the instrumental model and processes. The main question became: is it better to 
establish an internal institutional development process, and as a part of it, an integrated (into 
the national administration) and convenient (from the point of view the EU) institution. Or, was 
it better to build a new SF institution separated from the national governmental structure, 
where the SF institution fully fits with the European requirements. The investigated countries 
chose different solutions. The case study therefore deals with territorial public administration 
reforms of the selected countries and the SF management institution building process and its 
governance methods (multilevel, multi-actor).  
                                                           
1The research of Visegrad countries supported by the BolyaiJános Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy 
of Sciences. 
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While  the  European  Union  generally  considers  the  structure  and  functioning  of  public 
administration as a national internal affair, it has established a fairly strong adaptation force 
through the rules of utilization of Structural Funds (Pálné Kovács, 2009). From the territorial 
governance perspective, it is an important question. Each Eastern European Member State (EU 
12)  is  characterized  by  the  institutional  pressure  of  EU  Structural  Funds  which  push  the 
administrative reforms simultaneously with the SF management building. The Structural Fund’s 
relative importance is particularly high in the CEE countries, where the Structural Funds have 
virtually  replaced  the  domestic  development  policy  which  determines  the  national 
contributions,  the  national  development  resources,  and  therefore  significantly  exceeds  the 
volume of national development resources regulated by non-European Union rules. Therefore, 
the role of the SF is much more dominant in these cases than in the old Member States, and 
subsequently,  it  has  the  instruments  to  promote  a  multi-level  and  participative  mode  of 
governance in the new Member States. That is why the Structural Funds were able to influence 
to such a high degree the administrative reforms in CEE countries.  
 5 
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2. Integrating policy sectors 
Comparative analysis 
The degree of policy sectors integration depends on the (1) domestic management of regional 
development and the (2) institutional system built up for Structural Fund management.  
There  are  two  main  strategies  applied  in  the  CEE  countries’  practices  in  connection  with 
supporting the balanced development of the territory through domestic regional development 
management and implementation. In the first model (for example in Hungary and in Slovakia), 
the central administration of regional development is divided between two institutions a) a 
special regional development "sectoral institution" (Ministry), which is responsible for regional 
development tasks and b), a supra-ministerial institution, which is responsible for inter-sectoral 
coordination  and  for  the  horizontal  enforcement  of  the  territorial  approach.  In  the  second 
model (as we can see in Poland) there is a top Ministry which performs the management and 
planning of development policy as a whole, including the domestic regional and inter-sectoral 
development. These models vary through time and from country to country.  
From the point of view of the compliance of the Structural Funds institution to the domestic 
public administration system, two models can also be identified. In the integrated model the 
planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating institutions and procedures are not distinct 
from the domestic development institutions and procedures (PL). The separated model means 
that  there  are  parallel  Structural  Fund  and  public  administration  institutions.  This  model 
depends on the degree of administrative integration (using existing administrative bodies), the 
integration  of  programming  (the  EU  programmes  are  integrated  partly  to  the  domestic 
development policy implementation), and the financial integration (using funds according to the 
national  accounting  rules).  It  may  imply  therefore  the  appearance  of  a  mixed  model  (HU) 
(Perger, 2009). 
The South Transdanubia Operational Programme (STOP) case 
2.1 Public policy packaging 
In Hungary, the priorities of sectoral ministries were dominant during the planning process in 
the  programming  periods.  The  other  general  finding  is  that  sectoral  interests  were  often 
overwritten by political interests, which was perceivable in the reorganization and mergers of 
ministries,  forming  of  SF  institutions,  and  in  the  involvement  or  omission  of  actors.  These 
decisions were justified by neither sectoral nor regional interests.  
During  the  planning,  serious  conflict  situations  arose  between  sectoral  ministries  as  they 
competed for the same finite resources. In addition to that, the unused resources given by the 
EU  were  likely  to  be  lost  due  to  the  scarcity of  national  development  resources  that  were 
needed to match EU funding. Forced sectoral cooperations and synergies were formed (i.e. 
there were integrated sectoral OPs, where the ministries were forced to think together). In 
general, however, it is true that regional interests were not represented in the development of 
NSRF and the Community Support Framework.  7 
 
Inter-sector  conflicts  emerged  during  the  implementation  of  the  programme.  The  financing 
source of a project (by which OP the project could be financed) could become a debated issue 
as the aspiration in the course of planning was to prepare general OPs in which everything could 
be included later on (Interview B). 
Sectoral ministries also influenced the tendering phase. Tenders could be announced only by 
the approval of the affected Ministry. Initially, regional development agencies  as intermediate 
bodies  were  involved  in  calls  for  proposals  and  action  plans  but  their  functions  had  been 
gradually reduced since 2008 and terminated in 2011 (Interview B). Once again, the process 
became centralised and homogeneous. From the point of view the central SF management, the 
reasons  for  this  were  the  homogeneous  regional  visions  (which  did  not  justify  the  seven 
different  calls  as  they  stated  almost  the  same),  and  the  questionable  success  of  involved 
initiatives of the Regional Development Agency (i.e. making cooperation the basic condition) 
(Interviews  D-E).  The  management  situation  of  the  ministry  responsible  for  regional 
development did not help either to involve regionalization in the planning and implementation 
of NSRF.  
2.2 Cross-sector synergy 
A Government Commission for Development Policy was established in order to strengthen the 
governmental coordination of developmental policy during the preparation of NSRF. Its task was 
to coordinate the various national strategies. (It operated only until 2008.) In 2006, in order to 
represent local interests more effectively, a government advisory body responsible for regional 
development was formed as well. It was the National Development Council, whose members 
included experts, government actors and regional development agencies. However, neither of 
them was responsible for sectoral coordination. Thus, conflicts of sectoral interests emerged 
(strictly in terms of a relevant topic i.e. in terms of human resource development) mainly during 
the harmonization of OPs organized by the National Development Agency.  
The national strategy was prepared partly in a bottom-up manner, as the regions (Regional 
Development Agencies) had also made regional plans in advance but the regional efforts could 
not become stand-alone plans. Since 2007, there had been individual ROPs although they did 
not reflect true regional efforts since plans were structured from above, primarily under the 
direction of national sectoral ministries. So regional conceptions were often involved in sectoral 
OP,  and  only  the  remainders  of  priorities  could  be  included  in  ROPs.  Sectoral  OPs  were, 
however, characterized by local insensitivity (as it should have been the role of ROPs). Another 
planning mistake was that the strongly filtered ROPs of the seven NUTS2 regions were hardly 
distinguishable and contained no territorial specificities.  
The  planning  of  South  Transdanubia  Operational  Programme  (STOP)  also  took  place  in  a 
centralised  scheme.  The  elaboration  of  STOP  strictly  followed  the  continuously  changing 
requirements  of  the  EU  and  the  central  governmental  expectations  (Pálné  et  al.  2009).The 
planning process of the STOP was launched at the end of 2004. Following the decision on the 
main targets, the planning team determined the so-called strategic development programmes 
which were elaborated for each major sector with the exception of rural development. Then the 8 
 
National Development Agency gave priority frames for each ROP in which the prepared strategy 
had to be inserted. Some uniqueness and regional characteristics could be involved as well. In 
the case of STOP, the European Capital of Culture programme is a good example for this. ( 
European  Cultural  Capital  programme    was  involved  due  to  the  pressure  from  central 
government,  though.)  Interview  B  shows  another  example  for  projects  with  regional 
characteristics:  the  prioritization  of  brownfield  investments,  but  it  had  less  role  and  less 
emphasis within the STOP than the mentioned European Capital of Culture programme. 
 
Features of territorial governance 
Independent,  strong  and  stable  management  of  regional  policy  under  central  government 
enables the continuous representation of local interests and the involvement of local actors to a 
certain extent. If regional development appears as a strong sector then local interests may 
emerge  during  sectoral  negotiations  as  well  and  there  is  no  need  for  sectoral  or  political 
coordination. The Hungarian practice is characterized by the weakness of regional policy and its 
"migration" within the government structure.  
Whilst  displaying  regional  interests  and  needs,  the  Regional  Operational  Programme 
theoretically  guarantees  the  enforcement  of  regionality  in  the  use  of  SF  through  the 
involvement of regional actors. This has only partially been realized in Hungary, as in the first 
programming period there were no ROPs and even though ROPs they were elaborated in the 
2007-2013 period, they did not contain effective regional specialities as they were constructed 
on the basis of the residual principle; i.e. that took up all of the “leftover” priorities. It is already 
foreseeable now that there will be no regional knowledge accumulation as an integrated ROP 
will be drafted again for the country from 2014.  
Collaborative Plans serve the common development of the regions. In the STOP case, this was 
clearly lacking. There were neither development policy strategic documents nor sectoral plans 
in many cases, so even though strategic plans were made by the beginning of planning phase, 
there was nothing they could have been adjusted to. Later on, sectors used them mainly for 
adopting good ideas in the sectoral OPs. 
Intersectoral coordinating body in the central government is able to integrate various sectoral 
conceptions and can think in terms of a single and complex developmental vision. This could be 
beneficial  especially  in  some  regions  requiring  complex  development  even  if  there  is  no 
separated regional development sectoral ministry. This kind of coordination in Hungary took 
form in the organization of the National Development Agency and in the framework of the 
debates surrounding OPs with a sectoral approach. Thus no complex thinking was fully realized.   
The coordination of national development policy integrates visions, efforts of various sectors, 
sectoral interests and different sectoral and regional actors in a single  framework and uses 
consultation  forums  on  different  levels  where  local  actors  are  represented.  During  the 
preparation of the Hungarian NSRF, different institutes and bodies were  formulated; however, 
the coordination efficiency was reduced by the continuous structural and personnel changes as 
well as the political influence of some institutes and its leaders. In addition, at the beginning of 9 
 
the NSRF preparation, when strategic decisions had to be made (i.e. OP structure) and national 
strategic development documents had not yet been adopted, EU rules and requirements were 
much more influential than the domestic complex development ideas.  
 
3. Coordinating actions of actors and institutions  
Comparative analysis 
The  centralisation  to  a  large  extent  determines  the  coordination  mechanisms  between  the 
stakeholders  and  institutions.  Therefore,  we  should  analyse  the  centralised  and  the 
decentralised public administration bodies’ roles in programming and implementation. In the 
decentralised model such as we see in Poland, the regional actors have an important role in the 
process  of planning, programming  and  implementing  ROPs.  They  make  decisions  about  the 
allocation of the ROPs. In contrast, in the classical form of the centralised model, administration 
bodies of the central state are responsible for planning, implementing and managing the whole 
SF program, including the ROPs, as seen in Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. Even though these 
central bodies can involve regional partners in the planning process, it still remains primarily 
central, and the managing authorities are also centralised (Perger, 2009). 
 
The STOP case 
3.1 Governing capacity 
Regional Development Councils and Regional Development Agencies had a negligible role in the 
allocation process of the national development resources from the beginning (1996) to 2008. 
This  negligible  role  originated  from  the  limited  amount  of  decentralised  domestic  regional 
development funds. For the programming period 2007-2013 the steering competencies of the 
NSRF  and  the  OPs  have  been  concentrated  in  one  single  mega-organisation,  namely  the 
National Development Agency, which has resulted in the regions’ secondary role in the planning 
and implementation (Pálné et al., 2009). The National Development Agency conducted the bi- or 
multi-lateral consultations, working group discussions, where Regional Development Agencies 
were usually also invited. The seven Regional Development Agencies generally arrived at a prior 
agreement  and  represented  a  common  standpoint  during  these  occasions.  ROP  Managing 
Authority  represented  the  common  territorial  interests  during  the  central  and  sectoral 
reconciliations. Certain programs were passed on to ROPs, yet on the basis of the experiences of 
the previous programming period (Integrated Regional Operational Programme), the Managing 
Authority  strived to integrate “good, achievable programs” as well (Interviews D-E). During the 
negotiations  with  sectoral  ministries,  the  presence  of  powerful  local  politicians  meant  an 
advantage, so even if sectoral ministries were not willing to satisfy the demands of Managing 
Authorities of ROPs, regional interests could still be enforced by the regional political actors 
(Interview B). 
In the planning process of the STOP Pálné Kovács and Varjú (2009) identified the dominance of 10 
 
the  steering,  institutional  knowledge.  They  have  found  that  planners  of  the  National 
Development Agency and the Regional Development Agency were able to acquire a dominant 
role  because  they  were  familiar  with  the  procedural,  organisational  and  institutional 
requirement system, the specific terminology of European planning, the logic of reconciliation 
mechanisms  and  the  competencies  of  the  different  tiers.  Commonly  used  phrases  were 
“Brussels expects that…” “European knowledge”, i.e. being familiar with the “functioning of the 
EU” in Hungary at that time was the privilege of a narrow group of expert elite. A peculiar 
paradox is that the staff of the National Development Agency had a relatively poor institutional 
and steering knowledge of its own institution. The unstable organisational context concerning 
its new, fairly complicated internal regulation reduced the performance of the staff working 
there.  The  employees were  new  and  young technocrats  with  relatively  poor  knowledge  on 
public administration and the organisation itself, which caused some coordination problems. 
3.2 Leadership 
A peculiar form of coordination appeared with the fact that Regional Development Agencies, 
which  were  mobilised  as  intermediate  bodies, were  in  a  relationship of  subordination  with 
Regional  Development  Councils  (founders,  owners,  continuous  working  relationship),  even 
though no contractual relationship existed between the Councils and the National Development 
Agency (Interview B). Councils have been excluded from the processes since 2008. A specific 
problem in coordination was eliminated, however, which was caused by the unclear division of 
labour  (parallel  activities,  unregulated  situations)  between  the  regional  network  of  the 
cooperating organisations of the integrated ROP during the 2004-2006 programming period. 
From 2007, the same two organisations were involved in the form of Intermediate Bodies, yet 
this time their competencies were defined along the handling of priorities. Uncertainties did 
appear  in  the  beginning,  especially  since  Regional  Development  Agency  was  charged  with 
regional planning and the preparation of tenders even in the case of priorities which did not 
belong to the RDA. From 2008 onwards, centralisation within the Regional Development Agency 
resolved this problem (Interviews D-E). The problem in coordination was a result of the action of 
decision-makers in this case, since the involvement of the two Intermediate Bodies was not 
justifiable from the viewpoint of capacities, Regional Development Agency alone would have 
been capable of handling this task (Interview B). 
The  ROP  Managing  Authority  had  its  own  internal  procedures,  and  thus  the  involved 
intermediate bodies had other means to establish relationships with the applicants as in the 
case of other constructions. This relationship was also regulated by the Intermediate Bodies’ 
contracts. During the phase of planning, the Managing Authority handed concrete templates 
concerning  the  structure  of  the  OP  to  the  Regional  Development  Agency.  Until  2010,  the 
Managing Authority and the Regional Development Agency had been in a direct relationship 
with  each  other.  However,  from  2011  onwards,  even  the  relationships  became  centralised 
(where regional demands had to be to channelled to the National Development Agency centre). 
Initially, the various Intermediate Bodies had disposed of different contact persons within the 
various  Managing  Authorities,  thus  it  could  occur  that  Intermediate  Bodies  and  applicants 
received different information about the same question. There were attempts to apply common 11 
 
standpoints in the case of certain general questions, yet their wide dissemination to the public 
was not achieved (e.g. on a webpage) (Interviews B, E-D). 
The coordination competence of the Regional Development Agency was a result of a political 
decision, therefore it was accepted by every stakeholder. In a similar way, the designation of 
Intermediate Bodies was also a result of political decision-making, during which local networks 
and experiences of the previous programming period played an important role in the case of 
ROPs. The National Development Agency enforced its ideas through its standpoints, regulations, 
control and supervision of the leaders of the Intermediate Bodies. The management system was 
transformed during the programming period as well, the governmental change brought about 
radical transformations (designation of new Intermediate Bodies, centralisation, etc.). 
3.3 Subsidiarity 
A  continuous  system  of  feedback  served  as  the  basis  of  the  implemented  changes  in 
management and coordination. External expert opinions were prepared, internal institutional 
investigations were performed, opinions were handed in by Intermediate Bodies and applicants, 
and each tender was submitted to public debate (Interviews B, D-E). On this basis, there was a 
continuous modification of procedural orders, the practice of communication, the methods of 
implementation, authorization and control, the tenders, and practically the entire operation of 
coordination. This resulted in permanent centralisation, and during the governmental change at 
the  turn  of  2010/2011,  a  radical  institutional  transformation  occurred  which  involved  the 
appointment of new Intermediate Bodies, institutional leaders and changing competencies. 
The evaluation of the NSRF was also terminated. There was an attempt to incorporate the 
statements of the ex-ante evaluation into the plan. During this period, a mid-term evaluation 
was also prepared (KPMG, 2011) without any direct impacts since the governmental change 
interfered, and Brussels had granted permission to the transfer of resources between OPs prior 
to the publication of the report. 
New changes have occurred since 2012 with the abolition of Regional Development Councils, 
county governments remained the only spatial development and spatial planning actors which 
had accumulated practice in the process of regional development strategy-making as partners, 
but not as coordinators. Self-governments lost several of their functions which were transferred 
to the county-level state decentralised administration. Furthermore, the Regional Development 
Agencies, as Structural Fund and regional development institutional actors, have also become 
centralised organs, as they were transferred from the Regional Development Council’s control 
to  the  ministry  responsible  for  regional  development.  The  centralised  control  of  regional 
development agencies limits their functions directed at project generation and assisting and 
improving the position of local citizens, which has a highly negative impact on the quality of 
tenders. In addition, there is no regional stakeholder which would be able to fulfil their previous 
function.   
Features of territorial governance 
The  coordination  experience  of  the  European  funds  may  result  in  the  accumulation  of 
knowledge  within  an  institution  or  organisational  unit  which  is  indispensable  for  successful 12 
 
coordination.  The  Hungarian  practice  demonstrates  that  since  the  transmission  of  such 
experiences did not always occur (it was rather the professionals and the employees migrating 
from one institution to the other who preserved and brought those experiences with them), the 
advantages inherent in that system could not be exploited to the fullest extent. The South 
Transdanubian Regional Development Agency constituted a positive exception from this aspect, 
since the conservation and continuous development of the staff were regarded as a priority.   
The changing central government impacts the institutional system and the staff, which may 
hinder knowledge accumulation, cause uncertainty and threaten permanent functioning. In the 
case of Hungary, the governmental change fundamentally transformed the institutional system 
and its functioning. This included the way in which resources were allocated, the   circle of 
stakeholders  involved,  it  contributed  to  centralisation,  thus  producing  a  multiplied negative 
impact despite the fact that some of its impacts led to enhanced efficiency.  
Authorisation in itself is not sufficient to guarantee the effective scope of action - financial 
autonomy is also required. The global financial crisis proved that a considerable amount of 
external funds (EU support) and the conditions they implied (e.g. pressure towards integration 
or  centralization)  opposed  the  functioning  of  territorial  governance.  In  Hungary,  financial 
dependence  (from  EU  funds)  characterizes  the  central  government  -  which  has  no  proper 
development resources - just as much as the local and county self-governments. There has been 
a minimal flow of resources from ROPs towards the real sphere, and most often they served to 
finance the unproductive developments of municipalities. In addition, local self-governments 
have no longer any scope for autonomous development, and they have been deprived of the 
bulk  of  their  previous  tasks  and  resources,  which  has  decreased  their  financial  autonomy 
further. 
Experiences in partnership-making may contribute to the involvement of territorial stakeholders 
in the processes. Hungarian experiences in these domains are lacking, therefore deficiencies in 
partnership-building were observed during the preparation and implementation of the NSRF. 
The participation of local politicians may contribute to the enforcement of local interests and 
their  direct  representation  towards  central  decision-making  stakeholders  (in  the  case  of 
parliamentary  representation).  In  the STOP  case,  local politicians  were  evidently those  who 
channelled the local-regional interests, albeit in an ad-hoc manner. 
The Structural Fund institutional system was characterized by the process of centralization and 
recentralization. The centralization itself and the operation of the state controlled institutional 
system  reduced  the  flexibility  of  the  system  and  it  is  in  contradiction  to  the  principle  of 
subsidiarity.  
 
4. Mobilising stakeholder participation  
Comparative analysis 
In the design of the financial and operational framework of Cohesion Policy, the importance of 13 
 
the partnership principle has increased and includes civil society organisations. They are also 
defined  in  the  White  Book  on  European  Governance:  trade  unions  and  employers’ 
organisations; non-governmental organisations; professional associations; charities; grass-roots 
organisations; organisations that involve citizens in local and municipal life with a particular 
contribution from churches and religious communities. In this respect, the partnership principle 
highlights aspects of both vertical and horizontal integration. Cooperation between such actors 
can be realized through vertical and horizontal networks and involves the state, but also civil 
society at the local, regional, national and global levels (EP, 2008a; Oriniaková, 2008).  
The partnership principle is a general requirement of the EU towards all of the institutional 
bodies of the SF management system, during the whole implementation process. However, it 
was a great challenge, due to the CEE countries’ traditional, bureaucratic state administration 
system and their limited experiences in the area of partnership, which needs a new form of 
management.  There  are  two  forms  of  involvement  of  stakeholders  into  the  SF  allocation 
process.  First,  they  are  members  of  Monitoring  Committees,  and  they  monitor  the 
implementation  of  SF  money.  Second,  they  can  comment  on  and  create  the  sectoral  and 
regional  programs  of NSRFs.    According  to  a  European  Parliamentary Report  on  several  EU 
member states (2008a-b), it was common that the biggest umbrella organisations were able to 
exploit the opportunity of the SF consultation process. The involvement of smaller NGOs poses 
some technical problems when it comes to expanding the civil society partnerships in Cohesion 
Policy. Local or ad-hoc NGOs often lack the resources in terms of personnel and infrastructure 
to analyse and process documentation, and even to have a continuity of representation in the 
instances where they participate (different voluntary representatives attending meetings). 
 
The STOP case 
4.1 Democratic legitimacy 
In Hungary, neither traditions nor national rules for partnership-building existed, and the civil 
sphere was not able to realize self-organizing and bottom-up organizations. Civil society had the 
pretext that the centre authorities had selected the partners for itself so the more active and 
less “disciplined” civil organisations were excluded. The opportunity for partnership building 
resulted in a competitive situation in the civil sphere, where the civil organizations used this 
new situation to consolidate their position. The members of the SF institutional system were 
looking for partners whose involvement would match the EU’s requirements. From the point of 
view of SF institutions, partnership building was a compulsory extra task; they just wanted to 
imitate  its  performance.  The  other  aspect  of  partnership  requirements  was  interest 
reconciliation with the NGO partners during the programming period (Perger, 2009).  
In Hungary, the professional groups and civil society in many cases were only involved in a 
formal way in the program’s public consultation. This meant that some proposals were not or 
were  only  partially  incorporated  into  the  planning  process  (KPMG  2011).  Smaller  civil 
organisations  did  not  dispose  of  sufficient  capacities  enabling  them  to  participate  in  the 
processes. 14 
 
4.2 Public accountability 
The tools of the public information were websites, conciliation boards questionnaires, strategic 
background  surveys  and  formal/informal,  thematic  and  regional  working  groups  (Molnárné 
Hegymegi, 2009). Formal legitimacy was provided during the preparation and implementation 
of the NSRF. This was guaranteed by the National Development Agency through the obligatory 
procedures  of  publicity  provision,  societal  consultation,  assessment  and  the  inclusion  of 
partners (e.g. Monitoring Committees). 
The social discussion of the NSRF was a two-month procedure, involving almost four hundred 
organizations.  The  National  Development  Agency  sent  letters  or  e-mails  to  the  partner 
organisations  registered  during  the  former  conciliation  process  or  found  in  the  ministerial 
databases. Nevertheless, the participants complained about the one-way communication: in the 
majority of the forums the intentions of the Government were introduced and the debate was 
restricted to why the recommendations could not be accepted (Pálné et al., 2009). During the 
programming period the stakeholders characteristically were able to deliver their own opinions 
by web-expression. The National Development Agency started its own portal with an internet 
platform for web-expressions in connection with 14 OPs (from the 15). 1350 NGOs reflected the 
OPs (Molnárné Hegymegi, 2009). However, the time devoted to requesting comments was too 
short and bureaucrats had to observe too many regulations which prevented stakeholders from 
feeling its real effects. Smaller modifications were achieved. 
4.3 The procedure of STOP elaboration   
The Regional Working Group (set up by the law) of the region had 47 members, but there were 
no civil actors among the members; their role was merely consultative. The regional planning 
network was built up of representatives of micro-regions (with elected representatives), cities of 
county  rank  (with  elected  representatives)  and  county  spatial  development  councils  (with 
delegated  representatives).  The  Regional  Development  Councils  established  a  cooperation 
agreement  with  micro-regions  (settlement  communities)  as  well.  The  Professional  Planners’ 
Network has 7 professional, sectoral Working Groups where experts were also invited. The 
plans commissioned by the Regional Development Councils and subject to the reconciliations 
and debates were prepared by planning consortiums. The planning network was open, yet no 
one  applied  for  membership  (Interview  B),  members  entered  through  invitation,  who  were 
highly active, since a kind of anticipation was experienced from the side of the stakeholders as 
well.  There  were  certain  members  who  were  absent  from  the  sessions  because  during 
ministerial reconciliations complete sectors were removed from the ROP (Interview A). This was 
the case with the agricultural and the higher educational sector. 
The  stakeholders  had  varying  opportunities  to  participate  in  the  negotiations,  previous 
cooperation  experiences  with  the  Regional  Development  Agency,  Regional  Development 
Council meant an advantage, yet there were certain groups which were excluded from the 
negotiation, since the involvement of stakeholders was not functioning properly, only in an ad 
hoc manner (Interview F). While the entire NSRF is characterised by the imitation of partnership 
building, ROPs were evidently the most successful in this area since it was here the widest circle 15 
 
of stakeholders could be involved. During the preparation of the STOP, 90 conciliation forums 
and 30 micro-regional workshops were organised, which contributed to the involvement of 
almost 2500 stakeholders (STOP 2007). 
Economic actors were almost completely absent in the planning process of the STOP but to 
some extent traceable (Pálné et al., 2009). Instead, various entrepreneurial organisations were 
responsible  for  interest  representation,  individual  enterprises  were  absent  during  the 
reconciliations. One of the interviewees (F) reported that the involvement of economic actors in 
the planning process was rather poor, and it was indicated that the calls for tenders and project 
evaluation demonstrated hostility towards entrepreneurs. Undoubtedly, the STOP concentrated 
community type developments and paid less attention to project opportunities for the private 
sector. 
Certain  social  layers  or  groups  were  prominently  absent  in  the  STOP  (e.g.  gipsies,  women, 
homeless or elderly), and without interest representation they were unable to enforce their 
own aspects in the disputes (Pálné et al., 2009). In the meantime, the structure of the STOP, the 
planned  development  orientations  did  not  reach  these  groups  adequately  (Interview  B), 
therefore besides the absence of civil interest representatives, a lack of information and interest 
could equally be detected. 
 
Features of territorial governance 
Previous cooperation experiences of stakeholders determine to what degree they are willing to 
participate  in  the  partnership.  If  they  are  convinced  that  they  can  exert  an  influence  and 
powerfully represent their interests, then wider circles can be mobilized and be transformed 
into active stakeholders. Regional stakeholders’ good cooperation experiences were lacking in 
the STOP case, yet a certain enthusiasm was present which could be detected in the increased 
activity of the stakeholders of the planning process. The mobilization and formal involvement of 
stakeholders in the case of ROPs was the most successful and least imitated in relation to the 
Hungarian NSRF. The list of partners compiled during long years of the work organization of the 
Regional Development Council, the Regional Development Agency, provided an adequate basis 
for the organization of regional forums and included by and large the most significant regional 
stakeholders. However no stakeholders were involved who had had no previous relationships 
with the Regional Development Councils or the Regional Development Agency. New voices did 
not appear in regional development ideas in this sense. 
Guaranteeing the flow of information, the operation of adequate and wide-ranging information 
channels is a precondition for the accession and potential mobilization of stakeholders. In the 
case of the STOP, several organizations were excluded from the conciliation processes and the 
invitation of comments due to a lack of information; there was a lack of time for processing the 
mass of information, language skills and professional knowledge required for the interpretation 
of  regulations  and  the  various  planning  documents  were  often  lacking  on  the  side  of  the 
stakeholders. On the other hand, a mass of information channels and tools reaching a wide 
public were also mobilized in order to facilitate the communication of the NSRF. 16 
 
 The level of the organization of civil life determines the opportunities of partnership-building. 
Where private stakeholders do not cooperate in order to enforce their own interests, partners 
have to be detected in a multi-stakeholder set where each actor has different interests. Where a 
large  number  of  civil  organizations  are  formed,  the  identification  of  interest  groups  and 
interests  is  easier  and  their  involvement  encounters  fewer  obstacles.  The  building  of 
partnerships  is  harder  in  non-participatory  type  countries,  such  as  CEE  countries.  The 
organization of civil life was weak in Hungary during the beginning of the examined period, 
therefore, the involvement of civil society occurred in a highly formalised manner, along forced 
paths.  
5. Being adaptive to changing contexts  
Learning process 
The problem of political elections and the impacts of the continual (often abrupt) changes to 
public administrative systems have to be investigated as important processes that dictate how 
governance competencies are developed for SF implementation management. These had an 
impact on the functioning of the entire institutional system, internal and external relations and 
communication of regional policy and SF management. For example, in Hungary, continuous 
personal and institutional changes at the sectoral ministries, in addition to the unclear division 
of labour between them, inhibited the development of bureaucratic automatisms, despite the 
existence  of  unchanged  inter-sectoral  institutions,  such  as  National  Development  Agency 
(KPMG,  2011).  The  changing  intermediate  bodies  caused  problems  in  communication  with 
stakeholders  and  beneficiaries.  The  same  effect  of  erratic  communication  was  caused  by 
fluctuation in staff in the SF management organizations. The latter can hinder the accumulation 
of organizational knowledge, even in a centralized system, such as the Hungarian one. The 
impacts of the governmental change resulted in a disruption between sectoral portfolios and 
the National Development Agency precisely in 2010, when they should have collaborated at the 
level of strategic planning (preparation for the new programming period, rethinking the rules of 
the spending money in light of the financial crisis and the midterm evaluation reports).  
The managing organization of the SF, the National Development Agency’s young technocrats did 
not always possess experiences and accumulated knowledge, nor did the new organization have 
its own identity as National Development Agency, and yet the coordinative function was taken 
away  from  ministries,  the  majority  of  which  had  acquired  institutional  knowledge  and 
traditions. While personal and institutional learning generally encountered obstacles due to the 
fluctuation of the staff and the cooperating and implementing bodies, positive processes did 
occur in this respect. For instance, experience showed that the movement of persons with 
adequate  knowledge  accompanied  the  institutional  changes  within  the  institutional  system; 
their  migration  went  hand  in  hand  with  the  redistribution  of  tasks.  The  enhancement  of 
knowledge  accumulation  was  facilitated  within  the  National  Development  Agency  through 
continuous feedback, the involvement of external advisors, evaluations, handbooks, guidelines, 
standpoints, reorganizations (specialization), but due to an overburdened staff, this could not 
be  exploited  to  the  fullest.  However,  in  the  case  of  certain  mechanisms,  procedures  and 17 
 
repeated tasks, institutional learning was apparent.  
The utilization of regional knowledge was made possible through the involvement of Regional 
Development Agencies in the planning and implementation process which had accumulated 
knowledge on the basis of their previous experiences. By now, Regional Development Agencies 
dispose of such great institutional knowledge (as intermediate bodies of the second period) that 
no matter if ROPs are abolished from 2013 onwards, the present centrally controlled agencies 
(with  their  regional  knowledge,  partners  and  networks)  subordinated  to  the  Ministry 
responsible for development will likely be involved in the form of Intermediate Bodies. The 
“employment” of other regional stakeholders disposing of sectoral knowledge or knowledge 
about spatial development was basically absent in the 2007-13 period.  
The knowledge accumulation of stakeholders involved in the absorption of Structural Funds and 
planning must also be mentioned. A wide circle of regional stakeholders acquired knowledge in 
the preparation of projects; counselling and project writing companies were established which 
“filter” the tenders in advance in order to select those which are worth dealing with, and they 
generate tenders which would be impossible within the institutional system. The knowledge of 
their region, their system of relationships, their local knowledge and often even the reputation 
of stakeholders involved in the reconciliation of plans showed an increase, their participation at 
the forums permitted them to continuously access new information.    
 
Risk-taking, experimentation 
The  interviewees  expressed  different  opinions  about  risk  taking  possibilities  and 
experimentation  during  the  planning  and/or  implementation  of  STOP.  According  to  other 
arguments the whole ROP was in fact an experiment (there had not been such a program earlier 
in Hungary) (Interview B). Experiments could better be involved in ROPs than in other OPs just 
because the remainders from sectors were placed here and ministries were less interested in 
them so experimentation was more likely to be permitted in the case of ROPs. .Due to the effect 
of the economic crisis, there had been more opportunities for experimentation since 2009 as 
the whole government was engaged in seeking a way out of the crises. Thus the Managing 
Authority of ROP was given more chance to try innovations (Interviews D-E). 
 
Leftoility and proactivity 
It cannot be stated that the National Development Agency and the ROP’s Managing Authority, 
the National Development Agency’s organizational units have been flexible at all or that flexible 
solutions  were  incorporated  in  the  coordination.  On  the  contrary,  they  showed  all  the 
characteristics of a centralized, bureaucratic organization. In addition, it was politicized with 
strong relationships of subordination with the industry and the government.  
Regional Development Agencies were "independent" organizations, but they were directed by 
Regional  Development  Councils  consisting  of  local  and  county  politicians.  As  Intermediate 
Bodies they were powerless actors, but there their relationships of subordination were derived 
from Intermediate Bodies contracts and later on controlled directly by ministries. Thus, in terms 18 
 
of procedures, Regional Development Agencies were absolutely inflexible. With the increase of 
centralization (from 2008), the possibility of flexibility within the institutional system decreased 
even further. 
There was no evidence of taking contingencies into account, neither of the consideration of a 
"Plan B" (Interviews B-E). All actors adapted to the Commission’s expectations and higher-level 
political  decisions  and  the  National  Development  Agencies  coordinated  accordingly.  Other 
actors were not involved in shaping the events (external, authorized experts were invited for 
this purpose) (Interviews F,H). They tried to amend the given “A” version within the scope of 
possibilities. They had no impact on the effective structures, the actors involved, and resource 
allocation i.e. they were lacking substantial influence. In fact, each actor followed the events, 
tried to adjust to the new expectations and rules, and no one was proactive or prepared for the 
different scenarios. On the other hand, there was not sufficient time for participants in the 
course  of  planning  and  implementation.  They  were  lucky  if  they  could  follow  the  calls  for 
applications at all and become familiar with the current rules, etc. (Interviews A-B). 
 
Features of territorial governance 
The effective mobilization of stakeholders disposing of territorial knowledge in the processes 
contributes  to  the  territorial  insertion  of  governance.  These  actors  are  able  to  adequately 
mediate  the  specific  problems,  interests  and  efforts  of  individual  or  several  groups  of 
stakeholders,  enhance  efficiency  during  the  phase  of  planning-preparation  and  foster  the 
mobilisation and activity of stakeholders during implementation. The exploitation of territorial 
knowledge  has  been  ambiguous  in  the  Hungarian  practice.  The  involvement  of  Regional 
Development Agencies has evidently contributed to the territorial insertion of the NSRF, yet the 
“exclusion” of characteristic territorial stakeholders led to the omission of important territorial 
sectoral knowledge from ROPs. 
Institutional  learning  (SF  management,  Intermediate  Body-type  organizations)  may  largely 
contribute to successful territorial governance, but if this knowledge stands in opposition to the 
expectations of a traditional, centralist political environment, then the external interventions of 
politics may eliminate the positive effects. In Hungary, there was institutional learning at the SF 
institution, but the political interventions that took place during the entire examined period and 
at  every  level  of  the  institutional  system  and  the  processes  limited  the  consolidation  and 
retention of the this learning.  
Centralization reduces flexibility and the propensity to take risks. A central, entirely inflexible, 
practically  zero  risk  taking  system  was  established  for  the  absorption  of  SF  funds  in  the 
Hungarian practice, which was further strengthened by a recentralization trend following the 
most recent governmental change. This has resulted in the extremely rigid structure of the 
Hungarian National Development Agency. 
Through  a transparent division  of  labour  within  the  institution designed  for  a  specific  task, 
conflicts surrounding the scope of competencies can be avoided, coordination is simplified, and 
„firm” institutional units are born, which do not hesitate instead of resolving a problem, do not 19 
 
wait for an answer from the top and do not postpone affairs. This was not so in the Hungarian 
case, not even at the highest level of the institutional system, and as we descend down towards 
the Intermediate Bodies, we encounter ever growing uncertainties concerning even their own 
scope of and potential for intervention. Moreover, uncertainties were further increased by the 
constantly changing division of labour, the political exposure and dependence of institutional 
units. 
6. Realising place-based/territorial specificities  
Place-based dimensions of ROPs 
From  the  point  of  view  the  South  Transdanubia  OP,  it  is  evident  (Interviews  A-E)  that  the 
intervention area is the NUTS 2 region accepted by the EUROSTAT. The decision about the 
adoption  of  a  territorial  OP  was  made  during  the  committees’  reconciliations  (it  was  not 
permitted  during  2004-06),  and  it  was  here  that  the  appropriate  scale  to  be  used  was 
determined.  The  main question  was  whether there  would be  an  individual  ROP or  only  an 
Integrated Regional Operational Programme, or whether the NSRF would adopt any kind of 
place-based approach.  
The Regional Operational Programs and special programs with territorial aspects within the 
NSRFs reflect the place-based approach of European regional and Cohesion Policy. In the CEE 
countries, it is common for separate regional operational programs to be introduced in several 
steps. Since 2004, Hungary and Poland have had an integrated ROP, while Slovakia  had no 
regional operational program. From 2007, Slovakia and Romania chose to develop integrated 
regional operational programs, although the Bratislava region is not a cohesion region, so it has 
its  own  (competitiveness)  regional  program.  On  the  other  hand,  Hungary  and  Poland  have 
separate regional operational programs. In Poland, a decentralised SF institution was created, 
while in Hungary, the managing authority of the ROPs has remained the National Development 
Agency (a centralised institution). But, it should also be mentioned, that the territorial scale of 
the Hungarian ROPs (namely the planning regions) lack traditions, regional identity and regional-
scale participants, so this form of place-based development can not be as successful as the 
Polish solution.   
There were some place-based examples in the Hungarian NSRF, for example the so called Pole 
Program,  and  the  urban  rehabilitation  projects  with  the  required  Integrated  Urban 
Development Strategies. But these weren’t success stories. In contrast, the European Cultural 
Capital 2010 program is designated as a flagship project in the STOP, of which details are in 
ESPON TANGO Case Study No. 10. 
 
Boundaries as barriers 
The administrative boundaries hinder the planning and implementation of the ROP in several 
respects. During the planning phase, the 3 counties which comprise the region strived to attain 
“harmonisation”. For instance, there were serious negotiations for it in Pécs and Baranya county 20 
 
which  received  financing  for  the  European  Cultural  Capital  project,  then  proportionate 
“program parts” were due for the other two counties as well. The regional interests fell through 
the cracks (there was no stakeholder who could have represented them, since the Regional 
Development Council was comprised of county and local self-governmental politicians!), and as 
a result, the possibilities of cooperation were not exploited. Everybody was thinking in terms of 
projects  whose  realization  was  located  within  administrative  borders  (county,  settlement) 
(Interviews F, G, H). That is the reason why no complex programs were realized on the basis of 
the ROP. 
 
Territorial knowledge and effects 
The enhancement of territorial knowledge could be clearly detected in  the case of Regional 
Development Agencies. According to an interviewee (A), the role of the South Transdanubian 
RDA was that even though several local, regional stakeholders disposed of regional knowledge 
in their own area and sector, the widest and most complex such knowledge was presumably 
concentrated in the Regional Development Agency. Unfortunately the centralization trend has 
reached  them  as  well,  so  eventually  they  have  become  centrally  controlled  professional 
organizations albeit disposing of local offices as well.  
The territorial impacts of the program can be demonstrated by the ex-post evaluation. The 
former  ex-ante  evaluation  projected  the  conservation  of  the  situation  of  the  lagging  South 
Transdanubian region and possibly a putting an end to the deterioration; therefore this is how it 
appeared among the OP’s objectives. On top of all this, according to the ex-ante report, this 
impact will be a result of the full NSRF (Interwiev B). What is certain, regardless of territorial 
impacts, is that there will be no individual STOP during the period post-2014, only an integrated 
regional  OP  for  the  six  cohesion  regions,  which  already  forecasts  uniform  future  programs 
totally un-adapted to regional specificities.  
 
Features of territorial governance 
The  involvement  of  administrative  regions  may  strengthen  the  integration  of  the  regional 
interests  into  the  plans  and  implementation.  Non-administrative  regions  are  artificial 
constructions  whose  regional  embeddedness  and  identity  is  weak  or  lacking,  so  the  ROPs 
designed for them are less capable of enforcing the place-based approach. The Hungarian NUTS 
2  regions  are  merely  planning  units  with  management  organs  where  local-territorial 
municipalities disposed of votes. Therefore, the representation of territorial interests and the 
territorial identity were absent from the Hungarian practice, which hindered the elaboration of 
effective regional programs. 
The preparation and implementation of complex regional development programs instead of 
individual fragmented projects may contribute to a more efficient concentration of resources 
and  thereby  serves  more  efficiently  the  development  of  the  entire  region.  In  contrast,  the 
Hungarian  practice  was  lacking  and  almost  rendered  impossible  the  execution  of  complex 
programs. This was due to divergence during the planning phase, where the state emphasis was 21 
 
placed on generalization and not on concentration, while the local-territorial self-governments’ 
thinking was focussed within their own administrative borders and there were no stakeholders 
representing regional interests. The Hungarian ROPs therefore lacked an integrated regional 
specificity  and  were  designed  in  a  uniform  manner,  which  made  less  able  to  promote  the 
enforcement of a place-based approach. 
7. Conclusions  
This case study investigated the practice of territorial governance in four CEE countries from the 
aspect  of  Structural  Fund  management.  The  investigated  countries  represent  unique  and 
different  responses  to  the  institutional  pressure  of  the  Structural  Funds.  There  is  a 
harmonization gap in these countries, where the availability of Structural Funds has a significant 
impact on public administration, because the absorption of EU subsidies is one of the most 
important policies and political ambitions. Another common statement is that the partnership 
principle  was  a  great  challenge,  due  to  the  CEE  countries’  traditional,  bureaucratic  state 
administration system and their limited experiences in the area of partnership. 
Thanks  to  the  local  knowledge,  the  experiences  of  the  Author  and  the  deep  interviews 
performed,  an  in-depth  analysis  of  the  Hungarian,  and  more  specifically  the  South 
Transdanubian Region, was prepared.  
In  Hungary,  sectoral  ministries  dominated  the  management  of  the  preparation  and 
implementation of the NSRF. Even though an autonomous institution (National Development 
Agency) - which was entirely independent from the ministries and the public administration - 
had been established by the second programming period, the effective decisions were dictated 
by sectoral ministries even during the implementation phase. The entire institutional system is 
characterized  by  its  political  dependence,  so  the  governmental  changes  (and  the  changing 
orientations of ministries) brought about a constant transformation in the management system 
of implementation, its functioning, and internal and external communication. A strong Ministry 
responsible for regional development could still have been charged with the representation of 
territorial interests under these circumstances, but no such institution has ever appeared in the 
Hungarian governmental system.  
The  involvement  of  local,  regional  stakeholders  in  the  elaboration  of  regional  operational 
programs  occurred  only  during  the  conciliation  (commenting  periods) of  plans  and  through 
socialization. The preparation of plans was centrally coordinated and basically driven by sectoral 
ambitions. External experts were charged with the preparation of plans to be submitted for 
conciliation, yet no plan variations were ever made. While regional stakeholders involved in the 
conciliation process had a right to comment on these plans, and to modify them, their proposals 
had to be approved by central coordination and the individual sectoral ministries. At the same 
time, there were a small number of effective regional stakeholders participating in the planning 
process, since the stakeholders present tended to represent local sectoral interests. The political 
lobby,  which  certain  local  (and  parliamentary)  representatives  could  exploit  to  promote  a 
certain affair, gained more emphasis than the reconciliations. Thus, even though the Regional 22 
 
Development  Agencies were  charged  with  the organization  of  regional  reconciliations,  their 
power remained superficial  the “depth” of the established partnerships was determined at the 
state level.  
The  only  “quasi”  regional  stakeholders  involved  in  the  implementation  were  Regional 
Development Agencies, in the form of Intermediate Bodies, however their double relationship 
of subordination questions their identity as territorial stakeholders since they were evidently 
centrally controlled organizations in the SF management system. At the end of the changing 
processes the outcome was centralization and the narrowing scope of action of the Regional 
Development Agencies, and eventually the entire abolition of Regional Development Councils.  
Additionally,  the  administrative  boundaries  of  counties  and  settlements  meant  an  obstacle 
during the elaboration and implementation of ROPs. Unfortunately the individual stakeholders 
could not think in terms of complex territorial development, and there were no actors which 
would have been obliged to take this aspect into consideration (Regional Development Councils 
were comprised of county and self-governmental representatives as well and ROPs tended to 
finance mostly their settlement infrastructural projects).  
Approaching the end of the second programming period of the SF, it can be stated that a 
significant  knowledge  accumulation  has  occurred  at  the  coordination  level.  The  National 
Development  Agency  as  coordinating  body  and  the  Regional  Development  Agency  were 
characterized by institutional learning, while the personal knowledge accumulation was realized 
both  within  and  outside  the  institutional  walls.  Regional  knowledge  accumulation  was  also 
concentrated in Regional Development Agencies due to their regional conciliatory role and the 
operation of the Regional Development Councils. 
The National Development Agency as coordinating body and Regional Development Agency as 
Intermediate  Body  were  characterized  by  a  totally  inflexible  operation  where  they  were 
basically a pawn of political powers. Not least, this was due to the fact that, relatively speaking, 
the share of structural funds that were available was so high compared to what was available at 
the state level.  
While the ROP is characterized by a higher risk taking propensity than other components of the 
NSRF, since it is based on a residual principle, the sectors gave free scope of action to the things 
remaining therein. The economic crisis intervened, after which the entire Hungarian economic 
management and SF management were forced to adopt a higher risk-taking attitude. 
It  is  reasonable  to  ask  whether  or  not  the  STOP  is  a  success  story  in  terms  of  territorial 
governance. The answer must be no, since regional stakeholders were not sufficiently involved 
in the process of its elaboration and implementation. The region could not serve as the scale of 
the STOP, since fragmented projects were realised in individual settlements and counties, a 
complex programming approach was lacking and it was constructed on the basis of the residual 
principle. The OP management was overly centralized, and has in the meantime become even 
more centralized, when in reality international examples, – such as in Poland – demonstrate 
that territorial stakeholders may participate in the SF management in different roles and to a 
greater depth in terms of actual decision making.  23 
 
Definitely positive outcomes are the preparation of a STOP by the 2007-13 period and the 
establishment of an institutional system which has accumulated sufficient knowledge for the 
management of SF. Nevertheless, what prevents the author from closing the case study with a 
positive  tone  is  that  these  two  advantages  will  undoubtedly  disappear  from  the  new 
programming  period  starting  from  2014,  therefore  it  is  difficult  to  talk  about  long-term 
processes and impacts.  
References  
Literature and other sources: 
 
Bachtler,  John–McMaster,  Irene  2008:  EU  Cohesion  Policy  and  the  role  of  the  regions: 
investigating the influence of Structural Funds in the new member states. Environment 
and Planning C: Government and Policy 2008, volume 26, pp. 398– 427  
European Parliament 2008a: Governance and Partnership in Regional Policy. Ad-hoc note. Policy 
Department  Structural  and  Cohesion  Policies  – 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/governance_ 
/governance_en.pdf (08.05.2012)   
European  Parliament  2008b:  Governance  and  Partnership  in  Regional  Policy.  Ad-hoc  note. 
Annex.  Policy  Department  Structural  and  Cohesion  Policies  –  http://edz.bib.uni-
mannheim.de/daten/edz-ma/ep/08/EST19854.pdf (08.05.2012)  
Hungarian NSRF: The New Hungary Development Plan. National Strategic Reference Framework 
of Hungary 2007–2013. Date of the decision of the European Commission: 7 May 2007 – 
http://www.nfu.hu/the_new_hungary_development_plan_ (19.05.2012)  
KPMG 2011: Az Operatív Programok félidei értékeléseinek szintézise. (Syntheses of the mid-
term evaluations of Operational Programs). KPMG. Budapest, 2011. 
Molnárné  Hegymegi  Krisztina,  2009:  A  magyar  civil  szerveztek  részvétele  az  európai  uniós 
Strukturális Alapokra vonatkozó operatív programok tervezésében és végrehajtásában. 
(The  participation  of  the  Hungarian  civil  organizations  in  the  planning  and 
implementation  of  SF’s  operative  programmes.)  Zárótanulmány  a  kérdőívek  és  az 
interjúk feldolgozása alapján. (Final report by questionnaires and interviews.) Magyar 
Természetvédők Szövetsége, 2009. 
Oriniaková, Pavla (ed.) 2008: Structural Funds and partnership. An analysis of partnership of 
public  administration  with  non-governmental  organisations  in  Central  and  Eastern 
Europe.SFteam, Visegrad Fund, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, 2008.  
Perger Éva 2009: EU kohéziós támogatások felhasználásának intézményrendszere és a forrás 
felhasználás hatékonysága, eredményessége. (The institutional system of EU cohesion 
funds,  and  the  effectiveness  and  efficiency  of  its  allocation.)  ECOSTAT  Kormányzati 
Gazdaság- és Társadalom-stratégiai Kutató Intézet, Budapest, 2009.  
Pálné Kovács, Ilona 2009: Europeanisation of territorial governance in three Eastern/Central 
European countries. Halduskultuur 10: pp. 40-57. (2009).  
Pálné Kovács, Ilona–Varjú, Viktor (eds.) 2009: Governance for Sustainability - Two Case Studies 
from  Hungary.  Discussion  Papers.  No.  73.  Pécs,  Centre  for  Regional  Studies  of  the 24 
 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences. 
STOP 2007: South Transdanubia Operational Programme 2007-2013. The Government of the 
Republic of Hungary. 
 
List of interviews: 
 
Interview A: Interview with a representative of Technology Transfer Office of the University of 
Pécs. Pécs (Hungary), 14.12.2012. 
Interview B: Focus Group Interview with two representatives of the Planning Department of The 
South Transdanubian Regional Development Agency. Pécs (Hungary), 12.12.2012. 
Interview C: Interview with a planning expert of the ex-ante evaluation of the Hungarian IROP 
(2004-2006). Pécs (Hungary), 11.12.2012. 
Interview D: Interview with a former employee of the economic development priority of the 
National Development Agency ROP Managing Authority. Nowadays he is an expert of the 
Hungarian National Planning Office. Budapest (Hungary), 07.12.2012.  
Interview  E:  Interview  with  a  former  employee  of  the  tourism  development  priority  of  the 
National Development Agency ROP Managing Authority. Nowadays he is an expert of the 
Hungarian National Planning Office. Budapest (Hungary), 12.12.2012.  
Interview F: Interview with a representative of the Pécs-Baranya Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry. Pécs (Hungary), 04.01.2013. 
Interview G: Interview with a regional development expert of Baranya county. Pécs (Hungary), 
03.01.2013. 
Interview  H:  Interview  with  a  representative  of  regional  development  department  of  Pécs-
Baranya Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Pécs (Hungary), 15.01.2013. 